Feb 15th 2012, 22:36 by G.I. | WASHINGTON D.C.
Republicans have relentlessly harangued the Senate's Democratic leadership for failing to pass a budget resolution. "1,000 days without a budget," was the title of a typical missive last month. On the weekend Jack Lew, who has just been named Barack Obama's chief of staff after serving as his budget director, defended the Senate by saying it couldn't pass a budget without 60 votes, i.e. without the cooperation of some Republicans. Republicans jumped on Mr Lew, pointing out that under Congress' budget procedure, a budget resolution cannot be filibustered and thus only needs a simple majority vote - typically 51 votes - to pass. Glenn Kessler, The Washington Post's fact checker, awarded Mr Lew four Pinocchios, the top score, for fibbing.
In fact, Mr Lew, while wrong on the narrow wording, is right on the substance. It is true that the Senate can pass a budget resolution with a simple majority vote. But for that budget resolution to take effect, it must have either the cooperation of the house, or at least 60 votes in the Senate. Only someone intimately familiar with Parliamentary procedure can explain this. Jim Horney of the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities is such a person. The following are his edited remarks from our email conversation:
It’s true that you cannot filibuster a budget resolution in the Senate, because the Budget Act provides special rules for consideration of a budget resolution, including a time limit on debate. So the Senate can pass a resolution with only a majority vote. However, the resolution does not take effect when the Senate passes it. It takes effect in one of two ways: if the House and Senate pass an identical resolution, usually in the form of a conference report; or if the Senate passes a separate Senate Resolution (as opposed to a concurrent resolution, which is what a budget resolution is) that says the House is “deemed” to have agreed to the budget resolution passed by the Senate.
But there are no special procedures for the simple Senate Resolution required by this second, “deeming” process, so it is subject to the unlimited debate allowed on almost everything in the Senate. If you do not have the support of 60 Senators to invoke cloture and end a filibuster, or prevent a filibuster from even starting (because everyone knows 60 Senators support cloture), you cannot pass such a deeming resolution in the Senate.
Because its rules are different, the House with a simple majority can pass a resolution deeming that the House and Senate have agreed to the House resolution so that it can take effect. This means the allocations in the resolution, such as for appropriations, are in effect in the House and anybody can raise a point-of-order against legislation that would cause a committee to exceed its allocation.
But this is for purposes of enforcement in the House only. What the House does has no effect whatsoever on the Senate or its budget enforcement. And vice versa, if the Senate deems that its budget resolution has been agreed to.
Does the lack of a budget resolution matter? Jim notes that budget resolutions are supposed to set limits on discretionary spending in appropriations bills and facilitate changes in taxes and entitlements via reconciliation instructions or via allocations to authorizing committees. But nowadays, discretionary spending caps have already been set by the Budget Control Act (which ended the debt ceiling standoff) and there is little or no prospect of cross-party agreement on tax or entitlement policies. Moreover:
With the exception of reconciliation legislation, it effectively takes 60 votes to consider any legislation in the Senate so it really does not matter whether the resolution has been adopted; if you have 60, you can consider the legislation, if you don't, you can't.
The bottom line is the budget process set out in the Budget Act works pretty well when the Congress can agree on budget policies. When they cannot, no process in the world can make things work smoothly, but Congress muddles through and does what absolutely has to be done (like keeping the government from shutting down or defaulting on the debt). Not having a budget resolution in place is a symptom of the inability to reach agreement – not the cause of Congress not being able to accomplish things.
So yes, the Senate could pass a budget resolution, but without the cooperation of the house or 60 votes, that resolution would not take effect; it would be an empty gesture. The fact that the House managed to pass a budget last year, including a major overhaul of Medicare, reflects its different rules that allow it to deem the budget resolution to have taken effect. But it didn't ultimately matter: the provisions in its budget, including the Medicare changes, were not binding on the Senate.
Aren't you glad you asked?
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This article shows a fundamental lack of understanding of how the United States Congressional budget process works. The author of said article tries mightily to seem steeped in knowledge, or at least to refer to someone who is, but is fundamentally wrong.
Republicans have chastised the Democrats, those in the Senate, for "not having passed a budget in over 1000 days." Which, even the author of the article admits, is true. Drop dead true. The Senate hasn't. Not because Republicans are stopping them, but because they can't. They cannot get their own Senators to vote for anything approximating a budget because things are so bad. No one wants to take responsibility for the spending, the deficits, the debt ... anything.
But House Republicans have done so. In the minority, they have offered alternatives. In the majority, they have offered bold ideas, and have voted for them.
The process is pretty easy to understand: The House has to pass a budget and the Senate must do the same. In this case, the House did so, and sent it over to the Senate. All the Senate had to do was pass it's own, disagree with the House and request a conference, so a deal could be struck. The Democratic Senate couldn't muster enough will or votes to do that. The Republican House did. One cannot negotiate something with someone who has nothing. That's the point, the Democrats in the U.S. Senate have nothing.
And should be rightfully criticized for it.
In November, we get a chance to fire a bunch more of those who can't do their jobs.
Because it's not true. One doesn't have to keep debating, or speaking on the Senate floor, reading the phone book or the dictionary or whatever. All a Senator has to do is sit there and read the newspaper or a book or just take a nap, and when no one has anything else to say, just say "I note the absence of a quorum."
And that's it. He can do that for days, weeks, months. And he doesn't even have to be the one there to do it. He can have another Senator swap in for him if he wants while going home or out to dinner. In a nutshell, one Senator and his (or her) friends, can shut down the Senate over a bill and never let it come up for a majority vote.
Mr. Horney is being misleading.
There is a distinction between passing a budget and passing an appropriation. Without appropriations, the budget is merely a shopping list of things the government would like to buy. Since all Congressional appropriations must pass both houses, and revenue bills MUST pass the House (the House explicitly retains the "power of the purse"), it is pretty irrelevant as to whether the Senate can "deem" things with a supermajority vote. As a consequence, the Senate can never unilaterally pass an appropriations, even with 60 votes.
What Horney is referring to as a "deeming resolution" is only authorized for a limited purpose: In years when Congress is late in adopting, or does not adopt, a budget resolution, the House and Senate independently may adopt “deeming resolution” provisions for the purpose of enforcing certain budget levels. However, this is not the same as appropriating money.
A budget authorization sets policies and funding limits for agencies/programs -- basically it is when existing agencies, departments within the government, request funding for operations, expenditures, and other costs in maintaining all functions the department or agency is responsible for. Appropriations legislation is what a department or agency needs before it can cut a check or sign a contract. In theory, Congress could pass a budget, and then not appropriate any money for it.
Appropriations http://senate.gov/reference/glossary_term/appropriation.htm
Budget Authority http://senate.gov/reference/glossary_term/budget_authority.htm
Yeah, I'm glad I asked by proxy, but I'm pretty well up on reasons congress can't do its job. I'd like to hear how they did.
This article is a farce. First the lone source of information is the ultra left Center for Budget and Policy Priorities. What's important here is the reason that Senate leaders THEMSELVES gave for not passing a budget. Sen. Reid stated there was no need because the debt limit deal already laid out a broad fiscal outline. The problem is that the debt deal was a short term plan to reduce spending in return for raising the debt ceiling. That plan would achieve nowhere near the roughly $4 trillion in debt reduction needed over 10-12 years that the President himself has said is necessary. The lack of a budget plan by the Senate, or a remotely realistic one by the President, means that there is no long term plan anywhere on the table by Democrats (for 3 years) to reform entitlements and bring the debt to GDP over time to a sustainable level. THAT is the problem with no budget plan.
What's changed that laws have been able to pass without one party holding 60 seats in the Senate for decades previous?
In previous years, it was used sparingly. Now-a-days, it's used anytime a Senator doesn't like a particular piece of legislation. Though, it should be noted, that what's happening now isn't a true filibuster. To truly filibuster legislation, a Senator is required to "hold the floor" by speaking. There are some further technicalities involved with that but for the most part, they just have to keep speaking about whatever the hell they want. What's happening now are Senators saying they will filibuster and then the Majority Leader pulls the bill from consideration instead of making the Senator actually filibuster. If Harry Reid would actually forced GOP Senators (and the few more conservative Dems) to stand up and talk, we'd see a lot less of this.
It's an interesting question: why doesn't the majority force someone who threatens a filibuster to actually put up or shut up? (Pun unintentional, but delightful.)
It's not like the Senate is successfully churning out a lot of other business, which might be held up as a result. And there might be a sudden spate of business actually accomplished. Just think if they started with something minor -- say an uncontroversial nomination which is being held hostage over something unrelated. Make the nihilistic idiots show themselves for what they are.
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Law making and sausage making. - Bismark
Regards
Except that NOT making sausage doesn't look too ugly. While not making laws is looking uglier all the time.
Amen. Live hogs are kinda cute, even.
Only if you're not the one responsible for taking care of them. (Been there; done that!)
Analogously, legislators and their antics might be cute -- if we weren't the ones paying for them.
We're NOT paying for them.
Well, their whole salary, as we borrow what is it now, about 40%
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These bills might lead us to more,
"I voted for it before I voted against it."
("or was it the other way around?")
Regards